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S ince 1 October the LSE’sCentre for EconomicPerformance has had a newDirector and a new Director
of Research. 
John Van Reenen has taken over
from the CEP’s founding director,
Richard Layard, and his co-director
since 2000, Richard Freeman. At the
same time, Stephen Machin took
over as the CEP’s Director of
Research from Anthony Venables.
The new director, who has been
Professor of Economics at University
College London since 1999, is well
known for his work on productivity
and innovation, for which he has
established a programme at the
Centre. He has been a senior policy
analyst to the previous Secretary of
Health, Alan Milburn, and a partner
in the economic consultancy,
Lexecon. In addition to becoming
Director of the CEP, he has also
been appointed Professor of
Economics at the LSE.
Stephen Machin, a leading labour
economist, has been a member of
the CEP since 1991 and has
directed the DfES Centre for the
Economics of Education, based at
CEP, since it was set up in 1999. He
has been Professor of Economics at
University College London since
1996. He has done pioneering work
on inequality, social mobility,
minimum wages and crime and is an
Editor of the Economic Journal.
The Centre was established in 1990
as the ESRC’s largest
interdisciplinary research centre and
has grown to become one of the
largest concentrations of applied
economic and social research in
Europe. Its work on unemployment
and poverty, worklessness, education
and skills, productivity, globalisation
and post-communist reform has had
major impacts on academic
economics and government policy
alike. This was recognised this year
by the award of a Queen’s Prize for
Higher Education.
Richard Layard, Richard Freeman
and Anthony Venables will continue
to run programmes of research in the
Centre. On taking over as Director
of the Centre, John Van Reenen said:
“We shall deepen the CEP’s
commitment to rigorous, world-class
economic research that remains
relevant to both policy and social
science. The UK faces major
challenges in the coming years and
our research needs to provide
original thinking in order both to
understand the world and to help
change it for the better.”
guardat the CEP 
New Director looks forward to the new research challenges.
Stephen Machin, Director of Research
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In Britain today, a little over 20% of people are poor, 
generally when no one in their household works or when
one person works and is not paid very much. If two or
more people in a household work and at least one works
fulltime, poverty is unlikely to be found (i.e. in less than
5% of cases). The proportion of children in poverty
(around 30%) is higher than the overall poverty rate
because children are more likely than adults to live in
poor households. In particular, they are more likely to live
in single parent households and are less likely to live in
households where two adults are working.
While poverty is measured in terms of money, it is not just
about money. Almost anything bad you can think of, poor
people have more of it: more illness, more accidents,
more crime, fewer opportunities for
their children and the most fantasti-
cally expensive credit. So it is impor-
tant to shed some light on where all
this poverty comes from and on
what might be done about it. 
Table 1 shows how poverty is 
distributed across households of
different types. In the second column
we see how single parent households
are far more likely to be poor than any
other household type, but there are
few enough of them to contribute only
one quarter of total poverty. Poverty is
high in single parent households in
B
ritain is exceptional in having much more poverty
than most of the other countries of Northern
Europe. Furthermore, poverty in Britain has
increased dramatically since 1979.
Britain also has a particularly large number of working age
“workless households”: quite surprising in view of its
relatively high employment rate. This is reflected in the fact
that, if you were not employed in 1996, the probability of
your living in a household where no one else worked
exceeded 50%, higher than in any other OECD country
except Finland. The connection between poverty and
worklessness is a strong one. Over 53% of poor children
live in workless households, whereas only around 20% of
children overall do so.
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worklessness
Stephen Nickell provides a profile of poverty in Britain today
and argues that it is high by European standards because of our
exceptionally long tail of very low skilled adults.
by Stephen Nickell 
Table 1. Individual Poverty in Different Family Types, 2000/1 
(1997 in brackets)
Couple with children 42.4 (44.0) 20.9 (23.0) 40.0 (41.3)
Couple without children 25.5 (26.2) 12.2 (11.3) 14.1 (12.2)
Single with children 10.1 (9.9) 53.8 (62.0) 24.5 (26.0)
Single without children 22.0 (19.9) 21.7 (24.3) 21.4 (20.5)
Total 100 22.2 (23.6) 100
Source: Piachaud and Sutherland (2002), Tables 1, 3.
% of individuals 
in each type
% of each type 
in poverty
contribution to
overall poverty
Poverty and
part because more than half of the single parents do not
work and many rely on state benefits. By and large, any
household that has to rely solely on state benefits will be
poor on standard definitions. It is worth noting that
couples without children are much less likely to be poor
than singles without children and that households with
children make up just over half of all households, but
nearly two thirds of those in poverty.
Table 2 cuts things a different way, focussing on employ-
ment status. As we have already noted, worklessness is
a key factor. Although only 17% of individuals live in
workless households, because nearly two thirds of them
are poor, they contribute more than half of all poverty. It
would be a mistake to conclude that these facts point to
a “simple” solution to poverty, namely get every adult to
work. Workless adults tend, on average, to have signifi-
cantly lower earning power than those in work. So
getting them to work would have much less of an impact 
on poverty than might be imagined, unless they receive
other benefits.
Table 3 focuses on child poverty. Here worklessness is
even more important. Over three quarters of children
CentrePiece Autumn 20036
Table 2. Individual Poverty in Households with Different
Employment Circumstances 2000/1 (1997 in brackets)
Workless 17.0 (19.5) 64.4 (68.4) 51.4 (56.7)
One or more PT 10.0 (9.0) 29.4 (31.9) 13.8 (12.2)
Head self-employed 10.9 (12.2) 24.6 (21.9) 11.6 (11.4)
Couple, one FT 14.5 (14.8) 19.7 (20.5) 13.4 (12.9)
Couple one FT, one PT 17.5 (17.1) 5.1 (4.4) 4.2 (3.2)
Single/Couple, all in FT work 30.1 (27.4) 4.0 (3.1) 5.6 (3.6)
Total 100 21.3 (23.5) 100
Source: Piachaud and Sutherland (2002), Table 4.
% individuals in
each type
% of each type 
in poverty
% contribution to
overall poverty
Table 3. Child Poverty in Households with Different Employment
Circumstances, 2000/1 (1997 in brackets)
Workless 20.7 (24.6) 77.4 (80.1) 52.8 (58.3)
One or more PT 9.7 (7.8) 42.2 (48.7) 13.5 (11.2
Head self-employed 11.6 (13.0) 30.8 (28.1) 11.8 (10.8)
Couple, one FT 17.6 (18.3) 25.2 (27.1) 14.6 (14.7)
Couple one FT, one PT 23.5 (22.0) 6.2 (5.5) 4.8 (3.6)
Single/couple, all in FT work 16.8 (14.3) 4.5 (3.3) 2.5 (1.4)
Total 100 30.3 100
Source: Piachaud and Sutherland (2002), Table 5.
Table 4. Workless Households in 1999
% workless% of individuals in workless households
Couple with children 7.3 18.1
Couple without children 8.5 12.7
Single with children 56 32.9
Single without children 29 36.3
% children in each
type
% children in
poverty
% contribution 
to overall 
child poverty
% workles % of individuals 
in workless 
households
Source: Dickens and Ellwood (2001).
53% of poor 
children live in
workless households
living in workless households are poor. It is clear from all
this that worklessness and low pay generate poverty.
Table 4 shows the distribution of worklessness across
household types. Not surprisingly, we see that around
70% of individuals in workless households live in single
adult households. 
Turning to low pay, we find that 72% of workers in poor
households are low paid. Of course, the relationship
between low pay and poverty is not strong in the 
sense that only around 14% of low paid individuals live
in poor households. This is because many low paid
individuals (e.g. students) live in households where
others earn enough to lift the household out of 
poverty. Nevertheless, there is a strong connection
between low pay and worklessness. For example, the
probability of working for low pay is nearly 60%, if 
the individual did not work in the previous year, but only
22% if they did. Alternatively, if someone is low paid 
in one year, the probability of not working 12 months
later is nearly three times greater than if they were not
low paid.
As we can see from Table 5, worklessness among
working age households has risen within all categories,
a fact which was first noted in the seminal work of Gregg
and Wadsworth (1996, 2001). This happened despite
the fact that the UK employment rate rose between 1979
and 1999 from 70.8% to 71.7% (OECD, 1995, Table A
and OECD, 2002, Table B). Since the rate of individual
worklessness actually fell over this period, what explains
this apparent contradiction? 
Some relevant facts are the following. Overall, neither
unemployment nor inactivity changed greatly from 1979
to 1999. Unemployment among low skill men (with no
qualifications) rose from 7.0% in 1979 to around 12% in
1999. There was no significant change for low skill
women. Inactivity among working-age men rose substan-
tially (4.7% to 15.9%).To compensate, inactivity among
working age women fell from 34.6% to 26.9%.
What seems to have happened is that the increase in
female participation in work is among married women
whose partners are typically working. At the same time,
participation of single women with children has fallen.
This is, in part, a composition effect arising from the
increase in the proportion of single parent households
where the head is a never-married woman who is living
apart from her own parents and, therefore, with less
access to childcare.
The rise in inactivity among men has been concentrated
on married men whose partners are not (or cease)
working and among single men. Among couples, we have
seen a substantial rise in households where both partners
are working (from 55 to 64% of all two adult working age
households from 1979 to 1999). We have also seen a
substantial rise in households where neither partner is
working (from around 4% in 1979 to around 8% in 1999).
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Table 5. % Workless
1979 1999
Couple with children 4.5 7.3
Couple without children 3.4 8.5
Single with children 35 56
Single without children 18 29
Source: Dickens and Ellwood (2001).
Poverty is not just about money
Perhaps the most interesting feature of these changes is
the significant rise in inactivity among men of working age.
In Figures 1 and 2, we can see the overall picture. The
key feature here is the rise in the median relative to the
10th percentile, where many in poverty are located.
These changes mean that the UK has a much more
dispersed pay distribution than nearly all northern
European countries (France being the notable exception).
Even in 1979, the UK pay distribution was dispersed;
since then, the gap has widened further (see OECD,
1996, Table 3.1).
For much of the period from 1979, state benefits for
workless individuals were indexed to prices. Thus, over a
period where median real wages were rising, it should be
no surprise that benefit increases did not greatly moderate
the rise in relative poverty. During the 1990s, however,
average real benefits did rise quite significantly, because
of the operation of the housing benefit system. By and
large, housing benefits can be thought of as indexed to
rents. In-work benefits also became more generous in the
later 1990s and the trend continues, particularly for
households with children.
Wage dispersion in the UK, already in 1979 higher than in
much of northern Europe, has since increased substantially,
both absolutely and relative to most OECD countries (the
US being a notable exception). Analysis of this increase
suggests that the increase in demand for skilled workers
relative to unskilled, in the 1980s in particular, outstripped
the increase in the supply of skilled workers, relative to
unskilled.
While the relative demand for skilled workers has been
rising in the UK, so has their relative supply. The outcome in
the labour market in any period will depend on which side
is winning the race. In the UK (and the US), the evidence
suggests that the demand side was winning during the
1980s and the early 1990s (see Nickell and Layard, 1999,
Table 24). In most of northern Europe, this was not the
case. The consequence of the demand side winning was
that, relative to supply, the demand for skilled workers was
rising and the demand for unskilled workers was falling. The
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Figure 1. Real Wages in Britain for Males Working at Least Half Time
Figure 2. Real Wages in Britain for Females Working at Least Half Time  
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consequence was a weakening labour market for the
unskilled with relative wages falling and jobs becoming
harder to find.
This is a very simple story and additional factors may be
important, notably the falling minimum wage (relative to the
mean) in the United States in the 1980s and the decline in
private sector unions in the UK over the same period. Some
argue that the contrast between northern Europe and the
UK/US is explained by the (in)famous European labour
market institutions, which compress wages and raise
unemployment among the low skilled. In fact, when
unemployment rose in most European countries in the
1980s, it rose proportionately as much or more among the
skilled as among the unskilled.
A particular feature in the UK exacerbated the decline in the
unskilled labour market. The UK has a particularly large
number of very low skill individuals. This is apparent for the
whole adult population and there is no sign of any improve-
ment in younger age groups (see Table 6). The comparison
with the other north European countries is very telling and
suggests that, relative to the UK, their education systems
have managed to raise a higher proportion of young people
above a decent minimum threshold.
The disadvantage of the long tail in the UK skills distribution
is that, when labour demand shifts towards those with
higher skills, the problems this generates are going to be
seriously exacerbated for the over 20% of the population of
working age with very low skills.
Table 7 shows that the rise in male worklessness is not just
concentrated among older men but has occurred among
the prime aged as well. The patterns of increase are,
however, different. For older men, the rise in inactivity was
concentrated in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly following
the recession of the early 1980s, but stopped in the 1990s.
By contrast, for the prime aged, inactivity has continued to
rise up to the present, despite the relatively buoyant labour
market in the last eight years.
The weakening of the low skill labour market suggests that
we might expect relatively larger increases in inactivity
CentrePiece Autumn 2003 9
Table 6. Is Literacy Getting Better in the Adult Population?
Prose Literacy Quantitative Literacy
% in Level 1 % in Level 1
Age 16-25 26-35 36-45 16-25 26-35 36-45
US 23 20 19 26 20 18
Germany 9 12 14 4 5 6
UK 17 18 17 22 20 19
Netherlands 8 6 9 8 7 10
Sweden 4 5 7 5 4 7
Source: OECD (1997).
Note: Level 1 is the lowest of five
and close to functional illiteracy. The
levels are based on tests as part of
the Adult Literacy Survey in many
OEDC countries in the mid-1990s.
Table 7. Inactivity Rates of Men (%), 1972-2002
Ages 25-54 55-64
GHS LFS LFS GHS LFS LFS
(ILO) (ILO)
1972-76 1.6 1.1 11.9 9.1
1977-78 2.1 2.0 14.2 14.2
1979-81 2.6 2.5 18.7 18.2
1982-86 3.4 4.7 28.3 31.1
1987-91 4.0 5.7 32.4 33.1
1992-96 5.9 5.7 6.9 37.7 35.3 36.0
1997-99 7.9 7.2 8.3 39.9 36.0 36.6
2000-01 8.1 7.4 8.5 38.9 35.2 35.7
2002 7.5 8.6 34.5 35.0
Notes:
(i) GHS is the General Household Survey, LFS is the Labour Force Survey.
(ii) Data are available as follows:GHS, 72-96, 98, 2000.LHS, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83-2002.LFS (ILO), 92-2002.
(iii) The inactive are those who are not working and not unemployed.LF unemployed are those without a job who are (a)
looking for work in the reference week or (b) prevented from seeking work by temporary sickness or holiday or (c) waiting
to start a job or (d) waiting for the results of a job application.ILO unemployed are those without a job who are available to
start work in two weeks and (a) have looked for work in the previous four weeks or (b) are waiting to start a job.
(iv) The GHS uses the LF definition up to 1996, the ILO definition in 98, 2000.The LFS series uses the LF definition.The
LFS (ILO) series used the ILO definition.
There is a strong
connection between 
low pay and
worklessness
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Notes:
(i) As in Table 7.
(ii) LLSI refers to a limiting long-
standing illness. This is reported in the
GHS, where people are asked if they
suffer from a long-standing illness that
limits things that they would normally
do. LHPD refers to a limiting health
problem or disability. This is reported in
the LFS and refers to a health problem
or disability that affects the kind of
work the person does.
(iii) The GHS failed to ask a consistent
question of this type in 1977-78. The
LFS question was changed in 1997
and we have made some slight
adjustment to the data post-1997 to
correct for this.
Table 9. % of Men Affected by Chronic Illness
Ages 25-64 25-54 55-64
LLSI LHPD LLSI LHPD LLSI LHPD
1972-76 15.0 11.2 28.1
1979-81 18.7 14.7 32.8
1982-86 18.2 12.7 14.0 8.7 33.2 27.1
1987-91 19.0 14.8 14.8 10.4 35.0 31.8
1992-96 20.0 16.5 16.2 12.2 35.5 34.3
1997-99 20.0 17.0 16.6 13.3 33.6 36.6
2000-01 18.9 18.5 15.0 14.6 32.9 37.3
2002 18.1 14.1 36.3
Notes:
(i) As in Table 7.
(ii) BSQ (the bottom skill quartile) is
based on educational qualifications.
Until the early 1990s, those in the
bottom skill quartile are a subset of
those without qualifications. Later, those
without qualifications are less than 25%
of prime age men. So the bottom
quartile also includes some proportion
of the next education group, i.e. those
with some GCSEs. NBSQ represents
those outside the bottom skill quartile.
Table 8. Inactivity Rates for Men in and Outside the Bottom Skill 
Quartile (%), 1972-2002
Ages 25-54 55-64
GHS LFS GHS LFS
BSQ NBSQ BSQ NBSQ BSQ NBSQ BSQ NBSQ
1972-76 2.2 1.4 12.7 11.6
1977-78 2.9 1.8 14.9 14.0
1979-81 3.5 2.3 4.3 1.9 20.7 18.0
1982-86 5.8 2.6 7.4 3.8 30.9 27.4 33.0 30.5
1987-91 8.1 2.6 9.6 4.4 36.6 31.0 37.8 31.5
1992-96 11.7 4.0 13.4 3.1 42.4 36.1 43.4 32.6
1997-99 15.4 5.4 17.7 3.7 50.6 36.3 47.4 32.1
2000-01 15.8 5.5 18.1 3.8 45.4 36.7 48.0 30.9
2002 18.8 3.7 47.6 30.1
There has been a significant rise in
inactivity among men of working age
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among unskilled men. Table 8 shows that this is indeed the
case, particularly for prime age men. Among the older age
group, the higher skill groups have access to good early
retirement packages. The consequence of these changes is
that some 50 to 60% of inactive prime age men are now in
the bottom skill quartile. Furthermore, the relative situation
of the low skilled has worsened substantially since the
1970s. Indeed, since the early 1980s there has been no
increase in prime age inactivity among those outside the
bottom skill quartile, whereas the inactivity rates of the low
skilled have risen over 21/2 times.
Inactive men over the age of 25 report themselves as being
in one of four major categories: full-time student; looking
after family; early retired; and sick or disabled. In the prime
age group, around 70% of the inactive report themselves
as sick or disabled. In the older age group, the equivalent
figure is over 50%, with another 35% being early retired.
So “disability” is a key factor in understanding the rise in
male inactivity.
To pursue this, we must first find out how many people
report themselves as chronically ill. In Table 9, we see that
just under 20% of men aged between 25 and 64 report
themselves as having a limiting long-standing illness
(LLSI), with around 18% reporting a limiting health
problem or disability (LHPD). This difference appears to be
systematic among the prime aged, perhaps because, in the
case of LLSI, the illness limits “things people normally do”,
whereas with LHPD the illness limits “the kind of work the
person does”.
Table 9 shows that the proportion reporting LLSI has not
risen systematically since the late 1970s. By contrast, the
numbers reporting LHPD have risen steadily. The different
patterns of incidence observed for LLSI and LHPD may,
perhaps, arise because LLSI is less responsive to a decline
in labour demand than LHPD, which directly refers to work.
Either way, what is absolutely clear is that the rise in self-
reported illness or disability in the 1980s and 1990s is
relatively small compared with the rises in inactivity.
In the light of this, is the typical person with an LLSI or an
LHPD inactive? The short answer is no. As we can see
from Table 10, the majority of prime age men with a limit-
ing illness or disability are economically active. However,
whereas in the 1970s a mere 10% of this group were
inactive, by the late 1990s this number had risen to around
35% (LLSI) or 43% (LHPD). Inactivity among prime age
men without an LLSI has also risen, but among those
without an LHPD there has been no significant change
since the early 1980s.
If we use these data, plus changes in the incidence of
long-standing illness in the working age population (Table
9), we can work out what proportion of the dramatic rise
in inactivity among prime age men is “explained” by the
rise in inactivity among those with a limiting illness or
disability. The answer is that around 70% of the rise in
prime age male inactivity since the 1970s can be
accounted for by rising inactivity among those with an
LLSI and that more or less all the rise since the 1980s
can be accounted for by rising inactivity among those
with an LHPD. 
Among older workers, the situation is different, with
around half the rise in inactivity since the 1970s
“explained” by rising inactivity among those without any
reported limiting illness. This expanding group would tend
to report themselves as inactive because of early retire-
ment rather than because of sickness or disability. They
would consist mainly of occupational pensioners taking
early retirement (i.e. prior to age 65), an option widely
available, particularly in public sector occupations (e.g.
teachers, doctors, police, civil servants).
The question, however, arises as to why all this rise in non-
employment has been so heavily focussed on inactivity as
opposed to unemployment? For example, the unemploy-
ment rate among those without qualifications fell from
19% in the early 1980s to around 12% in the late 1990s,
whereas the inactivity rate among the same group rose by
a multiple of around three.
Table 10. Inactivity Rates Among Men (%)
Ages 25-54 55-64
With Without With Without
LLSI LHPD LLSI LHPD LLSI LHPD LLSI LHPD
1972-76 10.0 0.4 32.0 4.0
1979-81 11.9 0.7 39.7 8.4
1982-86 15.9 28.8 1.2 1.9 53.4 66.6 16.4 18.4
1987-91 19.2 28.5 1.3 1.5 59.1 65.0 18.6 16.6
1992-96 26.3 36.3 1.8 1.5 66.0 68.6 23.2 17.7
1997-99 33.8 43.1 2.8 1.9 64.6 72.8 29.6 18.5
2000-01 34.5 41.8 3.2 2.0 70.9 70.2 25.1 18.7
2002 43.6 2.1 70.2 18.3
Notes: See the notes to Tables 7 and 9.LLSI is a limiting long-standing illness. LHPD is a limiting health problem or disability.
To answer this question, let us first consider another. Given
the weakening labour market for the low skilled, which group
would one expect to be particularly badly hit? A plausible
answer is that it would be the group that has an additional
disadvantage, namely those who suffer, or potentially suffer,
from a long-term illness or disability, which limits the sort of
work they can do.
The story would then proceed as follows. Back in the early
1970s, even the men in this group with low skills did not tend
to withdraw from the labour force. Around 87% of men in
this category were economically active at that time.
However, they did find it harder to get work. Back in the
1970s, those with a long-term illness or disability were three
times as likely to be unemployed as the remainder of the
work force. So, once the low skill labour market started to
weaken, those unskilled men with an actual or potential
chronic illness or disability were particularly badly hit.
Because the low skill group found it much harder to get
work, those operating the social security system found it
much easier to shift them onto incapacity or invalidity benefit.
Further, doctors, whose certification was required for benefit
entitlement, were influenced by their assessment of the
probability of patients finding a job. 
These might be termed “push” factors, forcing men into
inactivity. “Pull” factors include the fact that invalidity benefits
were considerably higher than those available to the
unemployed. This gap increased from the mid-1980s to the
mid-1990s, before falling back in the later 1990s. This
occurred because of the operation of the Additional Pension
system, an earnings related supplement to invalidity benefit.
Another factor on the “pull” side is the fact that, once in
the invalidity or incapacity benefit system, the pressure to
take up work is minimal. For example, Beatty and
Fothergill (1999) report that, in their survey of working age
men who had not worked for six months, only 5% of those
reporting themselves as long-term sick were looking for a
job. The upshot of all this was that the number of male
invalidity benefit claimants doubled from the early 1980s
to the mid-1990s.
It is clear from our discussion that public policy can be used
to reduce significantly and, indeed, eliminate poverty. To
achieve this, people in poverty must earn more, work more
or receive higher transfers. 
“Earning more” centres on the longer term issue of educa-
tion and the shorter term question of low pay. With educa-
tion, the key problem is how to eliminate the long tail in the
skill distribution. From Table 11, we see that public expen-
diture on education in the UK has fallen substantially since
the mid-1970s, reaching a minimum in the late 1990s. 
We know also that the relative pay of schoolteachers 
fell significantly over the same period and there is some
evidence of a decline in quality among new entrants to 
the profession.
Against this rather gloomy background, increased expen-
diture on schools is necessary. This is happening, but
recent research indicates that it is far from sufficient. First,
in order to attack the long tail problem, employing the best
teachers and heads in the poorest schools would seem
sensible. This would, of course, require significant finan-
cial incentives. 
Second, curriculum and teaching policy must follow the
evidence. For example, literacy and numeracy hours
appear to have had some success in reducing dispersion
in skill levels at the primary school stage (see Table 12).
However, the Improving Primary Mathematics project, initi-
ated in Barking and Dagenham by researchers at the
National Institute for Economic and Social Research,
indicates that things could easily be a lot better. The
methods used, based on those current in Switzerland, can
generate substantial improvements in primary school
mathematics attainment even in the poorest schools.
Third, a lot of evidence suggests that heads are crucial to
success and failure in schools. The conclusions to be
drawn from this are obvious.
While education is the key policy area for attacking poverty
in the long run, what are we to do in the mean time? The
obvious short-run method of raising pre-tax earnings is to
pass laws to prevent low pay. These may be in the form of
minimum wage or fair wage legislation. The obvious poten-
tial danger here is that this will cut the employment of the
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Table 11. Public Expenditure on Education in the UK 
(% of GDP)
Public Total
1975-9 6.02 6.42
1980-4 5.40 5.90
1985-9 4.88 5.36
1990-4 5.02 5.72
1995-9 4.90 5.94
2000-3 5.03
Source: Glennerster (2002), Table 1.
1998-2000 were the years with the lowest 
public expenditure in the last quarter of the
20th Century (4.5% of GDP).
The number of male invalidity
benefit claims has doubled
low skilled, thereby raising worklessness and poverty from
another direction. While simple economics suggests that
raising wages above the equilibrium level will reduce
employment, this is not necessarily the case. For example,
low pay establishments, such as fast food outlets, often
operate with very high turnover and a permanent level of
vacancies. Under these circumstances, a forced increase
in pay could even raise employment.
The introduction of the National Minimum Wage in the UK
in 1999 appears to have generated little overall job loss.
Machin et al. (2002), in a “before” and “after” analysis of
UK care homes, discover some evidence of employment
and hours reductions as a result of the minimum wage. In
this sector, minimum wages had a substantial impact on
the wage structure because around a third of workers
were paid below the minimum level prior to its introduc-
tion. Relative to this, the employment effects were small. 
Overall, however, the impact on employment seems to
have been minimal. This suggests that the best policy
should be of the “suck it and see” type. The statutory wage
floor should be raised slowly, relative to the general level of
wages, until employment effects become noticeable. To
some extent, this is indeed the existing policy where, from
1999 to 2004, the rise in the National Minimum Wage from
£3.60 to £4.80 per hour represents a rise of around 5.7%
per annum, slightly higher than the rate of increase of
average earnings. However, a somewhat faster rate of
relative increase would probably be safe on the employ-
ment front and have more of an impact on low pay.
What about “working more”? Dickens and Ellwood (2001)
calculate that, if work patterns returned to the 1979 level
and if work were made to pay enough so that no child
living in a household with at least one full-time worker was
poor, then child poverty would fall by 60%. So the combi-
nation of increased work and take-home pay is potentially
very effective in reducing poverty. Both “push” and “pull”
policies are relevant here.
The standard push policy used in the UK is the New Deal,
combined with Job Centre Plus. The idea here is to
provide a strategy for each individual in the target group
that leads on to some form of training, job search assis-
tance, subsidised employment and so on. This job finding
process is integrated with the benefit system so that each
individual has a single personal adviser who will deal with
all work, benefit and related issues. The process also
includes the possibility of benefit sanctions for individuals
who fail to participate in the programme or turn down
suitable employment.
The workless groups in the UK for whom New Deals are
available include young people (18-24) who have been out
of work for 6 months, adults (25-59) who have been out of
work for 18 months, over 50s who have been on any benefit
for 6 months, the disabled and single parents. The schemes
are compulsory for the first two groups. The New Deal for
young people started in January 1998 and evaluations
published so far indicate that it has generated 20,000 extra
jobs each year and has significantly reduced unemployment
rates among young persons. Furthermore, there is no
evidence as yet of a significant adverse impact on the
labour market prospects of groups outside the programme.
The standard policy of the pull type is the tax credit. This is
essentially an in-work benefit or pay top up that depends
on family circumstances. Such a policy raises both employ-
ment and take-home pay for the target group. For any
given policy, the bigger the employment effect, the smaller
the take-home pay effect and the size of the former will
depend on the extent to which pre-tax pay falls in response
to the increase in labour supply. By and large, if tax credits
are focussed on individuals whose pay is at or near the
wage floor (minimum wage or minimum union rate), the
employment effect will be small and the take-home pay
effect correspondingly large.
In the UK, the Working Families Tax Credit (WFTC) was
fully phased in from April 2000, replacing Family Credit
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Table 12. Scores of Schools 1995-2000, 
Maintained Schools Key Stage 2:11 years, Level 4+
% Reaching Expected Levels
1995 1997 1999 2000
Maths
75th percentile 63 78 83 85
median 47 65 72 74
25th percentile 31 50 59 60
English
75th percentile 65 78 84 88
median 50 67 73 78
25th percentile 35 52 61 64
Source: Glennerster (2002), Table 5.
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(FC), a benefit paid to low earners with dependent
children. The WFTC was substantially more generous than
FC, increasing both credits for younger children and the
threshold as well as reducing the withdrawal rate.
Furthermore, it included a new childcare credit. While the
overall employment effects appear to have been small,
when combined with the tight labour market, it has helped
raise the employment rate among lone parents, which is
now over 50% (up from 38% in 1993). However, the major
gain from WFTC and its successor tax credits has been
their contribution to reducing child poverty without negative
labour supply effects. From 1996/7 to 2000/1, child
poverty fell by around 3.5 percentage points, with the
WFTC making a significant contribution to this reduction.
The basic issue with policies to push workless individ-
uals into employment is the extent of compulsion.
Currently, entry into a New Deal programme is not a
condition for receipt of benefits for older workers, the
disabled and lone parents. This is related
to the fundamental question of who in
society is expected to work and who is
allowed to receive benefits without looking
for a job. Not surprisingly, this topic arouses
great passions and a great deal more could be
done to smooth the path of older, lone parent
and disabled benefit recipients into satisfactory
employment.
The basic issue with in-work benefits is the expense of a
fully comprehensive system that will lift all workers out of
poverty, given the UK’s skill distribution pattern. My guess
is that cutting the long low skills tail significantly is a
necessary condition for the introduction of such a 
generous system in the UK.
It remains a fact, though, that to eliminate poverty
among those without alternative sources of non-labour
income benefits will have to be raised to the poverty line
and then indexed to median wages. Even then, those
who, for one reason or another, are not getting the benefits
will typically remain in poverty, at least temporarily. Some
elements of this policy are being introduced, for example,
part of the new Child Tax Credit is set to be indexed to
earnings, as is the Minimum Income Guarantee for pension-
ers. Also, there have been substantial increases in the child
elements of the benefit system. 
Overall, however, to have benefits at the level to eliminate
poverty would be enormously expensive. Those countries in
northern Europe with very low levels of poverty (e.g.
Denmark, Sweden) collect at least 10 percentage points of
GDP more in taxes than we do in the UK and they have the
advantages of much shorter tails to their skill distribution
and higher overall employment rates. While it is feasible to
move further in that direction, it seems unlikely that we will
get far without a significant improvement in skills at the
bottom end.
The National Minimum Wage appears to
have generated little overall job loss
Stephen Nickell is a member of the Bank of England’s Monetary
Policy Committee and a member of the CEP.
This article is an edited version of his paper “Poverty and
Worklessness in Britain”, (CEP Discussion Paper No. 579), which
was his Presidential Address to the Royal Economic Society.
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by Steve Gibbons 
Crime and
property prices
Steve Gibbons uses Metropolitan Police figures for reported crime to
show that vandalism and graffiti have a significant impact on house
values, but burglary and violent crime levels in an area do not.
C
rime prevention and control are top of the
political agenda in developed countries.
This is particularly the case in the urban
environment, where fear of crime and the
direct costs associated with property crime
are seen as having particularly severe
consequences by discouraging local
regeneration and provoking a downward spiral in a neigh-
bourhood’s status.
Policy makers in Britain apparently share this view, arguing
that 
neighbourhoods have been stuck in a spiral of decline.
Areas with high crime and unemployment rates acquired
poor reputations, so people, shops and employers left. As
people moved out, high turnover and empty homes
created more opportunities for crime, vandalism and drug
dealing. (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p.7)
Certainly, anecdotal evidence suggests that persistently
high local crime rates deter potential new residents and
cause those who can to move to move out to neighbour-
hoods with lower crime rates.
There is some evidence from the US, suggesting that crime
rates do affect property values. For the UK, however, there
is no existing evidence on the subject. This study uses
crime data provided by the Metropolitan Police in London to
estimate the effect of crime rates have on property prices in
the Inner London area. 
The rather surprising conclusion is that burglaries have no
measurable impact on property prices. However, criminal
damage to property, such as vandalism, graffiti and arson,
has a huge impact on the value of property in a given area.
A possible explanation of this finding is that obvious signs
of criminal damage may be taken by potential
property buyers as general evidence of insta-
bility in a community, of lack of social cohesion
and of a general neighbourhood deterioration. 
A simple statistical association between
property prices and local crime rates is unlikely
to tell us much about how crime – or any other
aspect of the community – determines house
prices. This is because there are many things
about the neighbourhood that we do not
observe, but which have an effect on housing
costs and crime rates. Consider land prices,
for example: low local land prices attract
low-income residents; if low-income
residents are prone to commit crimes in
their own neighbourhood, we shall find
more crime in low land-price neighbour-
hoods. Unless we can allow for land prices,
regression estimates of the impact of crime
on property prices will be biased towards finding a negative
relationship.
On the other hand, burglars will target properties where the
expected return in terms of the value of stolen goods is
highest. Since high land-price neighbourhoods will have
high proportions of high-income residents, the returns to
burglary here will be high. We should expect to find high
burglary rates in these areas, other things equal. So we
must pay careful attention to the unobserved components of
property values that are area specific and attempt to control
for them. 
The detail of the equations used to structure the relationship
between crimes and property prices is set out in my paper
“The cost of urban property crime”, CEP Discussion Paper
No. 574. In particular, they allow for factors that may jointly
influence both crime levels and the prices of properties in a
particular geographical area.
Many police forces in the UK record crime at a geographi-
cally localised level. However, it is nearly impossible to
obtain this data at the present time in a form that is useful
for mapping to other area characteristics and to properties.
One exception is the Metropolitan Police in London, which
has made available to us a unique data set recording
property-based crime on an annual basis for the period April
1999 to March 2001. The numbers of property-based
crimes are recorded across the London area on 100m grid
references. 
The Met data lists by five types of crime: burglary in a
dwelling; burglary in other buildings; criminal damage to a
dwelling; criminal damage to other buildings; and theft from
shops. Criminal damage includes graffiti and vandalism, but
excludes damage committed in the course of a burglary,
which is recorded under burglary. Unfortunately, it seems
that the Metropolitan Police is unable to postcode other
offences accurately.
Although this Met data has exceptional geographical detail,
it is far from perfect in other ways. It is well known from
comparisons of victimisation surveys and recorded crime
statistics that the latter understate the true incidence of
crime – the so-called dark figure. Unsurprisingly, the proba-
bility of a crime being reported varies with the severity of the
incidence. However, the propensity to report a crime also
varies with the characteristics of the victim. Only about
45% of burglaries involving a loss, but without injury or loss
of earnings, seem to be reported, though that figure rises to
nearly 100% for burglaries that do involve injury and loss of
earnings. No information is available for reporting rates for
criminal damage. Our main data source for property trans-
actions is a sample provided by Ekins Surveyors. Ekins is
the trading name of Woolwich Surveying Services Ltd, a
wholly owned but independent subsidiary of Woolwich plc
operating in the residential and commercial property
sectors. In addition to its work with the Woolwich, Ekins
receives survey and valuation instructions from over 100
other lending organisations. The full Ekins sample contains
data from December 2000 to July 2001 for 10,464 proper-
ties in the Inner London Area, covering the E, EC1, N, NW,
SE, SW, W and WC postcode areas. We geo-code these
properties with National grid references based on their
postcode. After geo-coding and dealing with missing data
problems, our final sample is some 8,100 properties.
Our next task is to match crimes to properties. Since the
aim is to obtain a measure of the expected crime level within
a few blocks of a property, the calculations are based on
the number of crimes of each residential crime type
recorded within a 250-meter radius of the property and on
the implied crime level per square kilometre. For non-
residential crimes, the distance was doubled to compen-
sate for the lower density of non-residential properties. 
Table 1 summarises the key variables in the property price
and crime data. The top panel summarises the property
valuation sample. The focus of our work is on recorded
crimes in the categories “burglary in a dwelling” and “crimi-
nal damage to a dwelling”.
Taking these crimes for the London area between April
1999 and March 2001 and plotting them within a 1 km
radius on a 500-meter grid indicates burglary hot spots
north of Islington in North London and around Brixton in
South London.
Criminal damage, also, is high in these areas, but the hot
spots are more dispersed. They extend north from Islington
and towards Tottenham on the west side of the Lea Valley;
east into the East End of London; and on the south side of
the River Thames towards Woolwich. Recorded property
crime rates are generally low in the Central London area,
rise in the inner city areas and fall away again towards 
the suburbs. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean s.d. Min / Max Obs.
Ekins property valuation data
Property prices, 12/00-07/01 (£000) 235.4 244.8 14 / 4500 8084
Criminal damage in a dwelling (per km2 per year) 50.5 30.5 0.63 / 155.8 8084
Burglary in a dwelling (per km2 per year) 121.6 79.4 1.2 / 565.3 8084
Eastings 53091 676 51470 / 54840 8084
Northings 18064 664.6 16690 / 19590 8084
The propensity to report a crime varies
with the characteristics of the victim
The key results are summarised in Table 2. Taking account
of basic differences in housing types and broad differences
in geography, we find that prices fall by nearly 4% for an
additional five reported incidents of criminal damage per
year. Five reported incidents is an extra 10% on the
average number of incidents recorded. Surprisingly, at face
value, domestic burglaries appear to push up property
values. This implausible result almost certainly reflects
unobserved property, household and neighbourhood
characteristics. Higher returns to burglaries in higher priced
dwellings and the higher propensity for better-off house-
holds to report crime could bias these estimates.
We continue to find very significant effects from criminal
damage, even once we take more care in controlling for
local amenities, community and geography – distance to
underground stations, green spaces, police stations and
school truancy rates for example. But burglaries remain
unimportant, even in our best models. 
Consideration of the possible cultural factors underlying the
incidence of graffiti, vandalism and other forms of criminal
damage suggests another approach to our analysis.
Alcohol consumption is an associated factor in many types
of crime, although the lack of official statistics for the UK
makes it difficult to quantify the link. A study in one town in
England found that 88% of people arrested for acts of
criminal damage, over a period of five months, had been
drinking in the four hours prior to the incident (Jeffs and
Saunders, 1983). Official statistics for local prisons in the
United States indicate that 33% of inmates convicted for a
property crime (and some 56% of inmates convicted for a
public order offence) had been drinking prior to the offence.
Although the link between alcohol consumption and crime
is not necessarily directly causal, alcohol is often a contrib-
utory factor in violent crimes and acts of public disorder.
This may be because alcohol encourages aggression,
induces psychotic states, or decreases inhibitions. Or it
may be that some certain social environments encourage
both excessive drinking and disorderly or criminal activity. In
any case, a link between the location of crimes and the
location of licensed premises, and the time of offences and
the end of licensing hours is widely recognised.
So we would expect the incidence of property crime in our
London data to be higher at locations near licensed
premises, and for prices to be lower near pubs. Indeed this
is the case. For the average property, criminal damage
decreases at the rate of 3.5 crimes per sq km per year as
distance to the nearest pub increases by 1km. And there is
a decline in house prices near pubs that seems to be linked
to this rise in crime.
Why is it that burglaries do not seem to influence property
prices, while criminal damage incidents in a neighbourhood
do? Of course, homeowners can take preventative action
against burglars (alarm systems, barriers etc), which they
are less able to do to prevent damage to property. But we
should consider to what extent our estimated impact of
criminal damage to dwellings picks up the cost associated
with a high incidence of other crimes – for example, violent
crime, robbery, or vehicle crime.
Our data is slightly limited by the lack of information on
crime in other categories. Some unobserved crime
categories are cause for concern, because the estimates of
the economic costs of these types of crime are high. Brand
and Price (2000) estimate that average cost associated
with an act of violence against the person is £19,000, with
serious wounding carrying total costs of £130,000. For
robbery, their figure is £9,700 per incident. We would
expect the costs associated with increased risk of such
crimes to be capitalised in property values. On the other
hand, incidents of assault and robbery may be more impor-
tant in individual choices about where and when to walk the
streets. The location of property crimes is more directly
related to choice of residential location.
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Table 2.The effect of a 10% increase in crime near the
average property
Basic model
Adjusting for 
local amenities
and geography
Predicting from
the location of
public houses
Criminal Damage –3.9% –2.0% –2.4%
Burglary +1.0% Not statistically Not estimated
significant
n violence  n sex  n robbery 
n burglary  n theft  n criminal damage
Changes in counting rules can make comparison between pre- and post-
1999 figures misleading. Figures are adjusted for overall effect on offence
groups, but the Theft and Handling group cannot be corrected accurately.
All vehicle-related crimes (including some criminal damage to vehicles) have
been deducted from the Theft and Handling category post-January 1998.
There were also minor geographical changes to the Metropolitan Police
Force boundary in 2000.
Figure 1. Crime trends in Metropolitan Police area,
1993-2001
Recorded property crime rates are low in the Central London area
Changes in counting rules can make comparison between
pre- and post-1999 figures misleading. Figures are
adjusted for overall effect on offence groups, but the Theft
and Handling group cannot be corrected accurately. All
vehicle-related crimes (including some criminal damage to
vehicles) have been deducted from the Theft and Handling
category post-January 1998. There were also minor
geographical changes to the Metropolitan Police Force
boundary in 2000.
The crime trends for the Metropolitan Police Force Area in
Figure 1 also suggest little association between criminal
activity in the criminal damage (crim) category and what we
would perceive as serious urban crimes such as violent
crime (viol) and robbery (rob). While recorded crimes in the
burglary, criminal damage and theft categories have been
on a general trend down in the last decade, violent crime
and robbery have been on the increase.
What are we to make of our results? On the face of it, the
impact of criminal damage on property prices seems high
relative to estimates of the direct, physical and emotional
costs associated with criminal damage itself. Average costs
per incident to the household experiencing it are in the
order of £510 (Brand and Price, 2000). In comparison, our
estimates translate into a social valuation of criminal
damage in the order of £100,000 per incident.
It is quite clear from this that, if incidents of criminal damage
affect property prices, then it is for reasons other than the
expected costs of the incidents themselves.
A more likely explanation is that incidents of vandalism and
criminal damage impact on property prices because they
induce fear of crime. Graffiti, for example, comes out as one
of the few neighbourhood factors which is consistently signif-
icantly correlated with several measures of fear of crime. 
Criminal damage is certainly perceived as a problem by
individuals. In the 2000 British Crime Survey, 32% of
respondents agreed that vandalism was a “very/fairly big
problem”’ (Home Office, 2001), although only 10% of
these considered it had a negative impact on their quality of
life. Nevertheless, in the same study, between 33% and
50% of respondents in owner-occupier neighbourhoods
considered that disorder in general has a negative impact
on quality of life and 20% of respondents in affluent owner-
occupier neighbourhoods thought disorder was increasing.
Perhaps the most plausible interpretation of the results is
that incoming residents perceive criminal damage in the
neighbourhood as signalling higher crime in the area, or a
deteriorating neighbourhood in general. In essence, what
we are finding relates to neighbourhood effects of the type
described by Wilson and Kelling’s Broken Window
Syndrome. According to this hypothesis – popular in the
environmental criminology literature and with advocates of
neighbourhood clean-up campaigns – unrepaired damage
to property in the neighbourhood encourages further
vandalism, perceptions of community disorganisation,
upward spiralling crime rates and downward spiralling
neighbourhood status. 
If vandalism and graffiti are seen as predictors of neigh-
bourhood decline and precursors of escalating crime rates,
then it is not surprising that they impact on property prices.
Nevertheless, our evidence is that these disorder-related
crimes are weakly to moderately associated with more
serious crimes, suggesting that the disorder/crime link is
not necessarily causal. Physical disorder like graffiti and
vandalism may be symptomatic of deeper disruptions in
social cohesion and community expectations.
Steve Gibbons is Lecturer in Economic Geography in the
Department of Geography and Environment and a Research
Associate at the CEP.
This article is an edited version of his paper “The Costs of Urban
Property Crime”, CEP Discussion Paper No. 574.
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Alcohol consumption is an associated factor in many types of crime
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A
financial crisis swept across northern Europe
in 1763, which bears an uncanny resem-
blance to modern episodes of financial
market turbulence. In particular, it mirrors the
events of the autumn of 1998, when a severe
liquidity squeeze culminated in the near
collapse of the American hedge fund, Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM).
Although financial institutions looked very different in 1763,
the crisis then shows many features that would be familiar
to an observer today. Issues such as the role of high lever-
aging, liquidity drains in times of crisis and the intertwining
of credit and market risk were all clearly evident in 1763.
We see financial innovations that allowed nimble players to
increase leverage in a buoyant financial market and amass
rapid gains at the expense of increased fragility of the
system. We see the final failure of these same players
leading to fire sales of assets with all their repercussions. 
From a theoretical perspective, the events of 1763 pose a
challenge to our current models of financial crises. Banks in
the 18th century were underdeveloped by today’s
standards. It was uncommon for them to take retail
deposits, or to extend cash loans to the private sector. Their
primary role was in the payments system associated with
the trade in goods. The most prominent bankers were also
merchants, hence the origin of the term “merchant banker”.
The 1763 financial crisis does not fall neatly into the
textbook model of a bank run, where the main issue is the
vulnerability of a deposit-funded bank with a maturity
mismatch of liabilities and assets.
Agency-based theories that emphasise debtor moral
hazard fare little better as an explanation. Holland was the
main creditor nation at the time, home to plentiful capital
accumulated during its heyday as the pre-eminent trading
nation of Europe. Meanwhile, Prussia would be familiar to
many bankers today as a typical “emerging market” debtor
by Isabel Schnabel and Hyun Song Shin 
Lessons from
the Seven
Years War
A banking collapse in Amsterdam rocked European financial markets
in 1763. Isabel Schnabel and Hyun Song Shin draw parallels
between that crisis and the events that brought down Long-Term
Capital Management in 1998, concluding that liquidity risk was the
fundamental weakness in both cases.
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country. Hamburg played an intermediary role between
Amsterdam and Berlin, channelling funds and exploiting
the interest rate differences that existed between Holland
and Prussia.
However, in contrast to agency-based theories, the first
wave of failures occurred in Amsterdam, followed by
failures in Hamburg some two weeks later. The financial
crisis in Berlin was severe, but it arrived several weeks after
the crises in Amsterdam and Hamburg. More significantly,
most of the merchant bankers that failed in Amsterdam and
Hamburg were able to re-open their doors within months,
suggesting that the crisis was one of liquidity rather than
fundamental solvency
The increased leverage in the balance sheets of the major
market participants in 1763 was made possible by the
development of bills of exchange. As their name implies,
these first emerged as instruments to facilitate trade in
goods. However, by the 18th century, they had evolved into
a sophisticated instrument of credit – the “acceptance loan”
– that allowed capital to be raised on the established finan-
cial centres of Amsterdam and Hamburg to finance trade
and manufacturing in the newly emerging markets further
east, such as Prussia.
Reputable bankers would make their own creditworthiness
available by allowing other persons to draw bills on them,
which could then be used for payments to third parties, or
be sold on the bills market to raise capital. All the contract-
ing parties’ interests were tied together through rigorously
enforced laws on the transferability and negotiability of bills,
which meant that contracting parties were better able to
commit to repay. This commitment power had the virtuous
effect of expanding the universe of possible contracts
between interested parties separated by large distances.
However, there was also a dark side. The interlocking sets
of claims and liabilities bound many market participants
together through their balance sheets, even though there
were no underlying transactions in terms of trade in goods
between them. The combination of highly leveraged
balance sheets and interlocking claims and liabilities proved
to be vulnerable to the downturn in economic activity that
came with the end of the Seven Years War in 1763.
Just as LTCM took centre stage in the 1998 crisis, the
events of 1763 are inextricably bound up with the exploits of
one institution, the banking house of de Neufville Brothers.
Like LTCM, de Neufville’s business practices were initially
viewed with suspicion, but their apparent triumphs ensured
their meteoric rise and produced many imitators.
The analogy runs deeper than simply the role of a prominent
market player. Two features stand out. First, the increased
size of balance sheets and the attendant increase in lever-
age was not viewed with alarm in 1763 because of the
offsetting nature of the claims and liabilities. In modern
parlance, the balance sheets were “perfectly hedged” to
the extent that each liability was exactly offset by an equal
and opposite claim on another party. This is reminiscent of
the convergence or arbitrage trades much favoured by
modern markets.
Second, the contagious effects of the 1763 crisis were
exacerbated by the forced sales of assets to meet liabilities.
Merchants suffered direct losses when their counter parties
went bankrupt, but they were also affected indirectly
through the price declines resulting from the fire sales. The
actions of distressed parties attempting to reduce the size
of their balance sheets had an impact on the value of
others’ assets. Weakened balance sheets generated
further forced sales, feeding the vicious circle. The liquidity
squeeze generated by such forced sales received particu-
lar attention in the aftermath of the LTCM crisis.
This second point underscores an important distinction.
The modern treatment of bank runs emphasises the
negative externalities on the liabilities side of the balance
sheet: it is the run by depositors that precipitates the crisis.
In contrast, the crises of 1763 and 1998 are instances of
contagion on the asset side of the balance sheet.
There is, however, one important contrast between the
events of 1763 and 1998. In 1998, the feared meltdown in
the financial system prompted the intervention of the author-
ities (the New York Fed), which coordinated a buyout of
LTCM by its main creditors. In 1763, there was no such
intervention by the public authorities in Amsterdam.
Although there were attempts to prevent the failure of de
Neufville on the part of some of its counter parties, they did
not muster enough support. The importance of timely inter-
vention in crisis management (and the coordinating role of
a crisis manager) is an important lesson to be drawn from
this contrast.
The 18th century marked the slow, but steady, decline of the
Netherlands as Europe’s dominant trading nation.
Nevertheless Amsterdam remained the major financial centre
of northern Europe, followed by London and Hamburg.
Following the example of towns like Venice, Seville and
Antwerp, Amsterdam had developed financial institutions
that were crucial to the city’s development as a global
financial centre. The most important of these was the
Exchange Bank of Amsterdam, which was a publicly
guaranteed deposit and giro bank (i.e. a payments bank).
Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations has a celebrated
description of the Bank of Amsterdam, which remains a
classic exposition of the functioning of a giro bank in the
18th century. Accounts were kept in a notional currency,
called bank money, the largest part of which was backed
with the holding of gold or silver. By law, bills of exchange
had to be settled in bank money by a transfer from one
account to another. Due to the impeccable reputation of
Amsterdam bank money, it soon emerged as the key
currency in international finance.
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Berlin was still a provincial backwater in the
18th century. Its second rung status as a
financial centre was also reflected in prevail-
ing interest rates, which were much higher
than in Amsterdam and Hamburg. A network
of wealthy merchant bankers in Amsterdam
and Hamburg maintained correspondent
relationships to other financial and trade
centres. One important function of these
bankers was the intermediation between
these different centres. A need for such inter-
mediation arose from the fact that loans were
always based on personal relationships and
there were few bankers with sufficient
contacts and international reputation. The fact
that a large part of Prussian trade ran through
Hamburg also meant that commodities and
other assets of the Berlin merchant passing
through Hamburg could be pledged as collat-
eral. Similarly, trade between Hamburg and
Amsterdam had traditionally been strong.
Hamburg bankers were, therefore, ideally
placed to act as intermediaries between
Amsterdam and Berlin.
The Seven Years War and the emergence of
Prussia as a regional power was accompa-
nied by a shift in the centre of gravity in the growth in trade
and manufacturing activity away from Amsterdam and
Hamburg towards the interior. An important impetus for
financial innovation was the challenge of finding ways to
channel funds from established centres such as Amsterdam
to the capital-hungry regions further east, especially Prussia.
For the cautious Amsterdam investor, lending money to an
emerging market borrower in return for a promise of uncer-
tain quality would be a risky undertaking, even when the
Berlin merchant was commonly recognised to be sound.
This is a dilemma familiar to investors in emerging markets
in the 21st century. A large part of the solution came from
the emergence of bills of exchange in the new role of
acceptance loans. 
Legally, a bill of exchange is an “order to pay” (like a modern
cheque) rather than a “promise to pay” (like a modern
corporate bond). Thus, in contrast to a modern creditor-
debtor relationship, which involves a bilateral contract,
there are typically at least four interested parties in a loan
contract involving a bill of exchange: the drawer of the bill;
the drawee of the bill; the beneficiary of the bill; and the
holder of the bill.
Under the terms of a bill, the drawer requires the drawee to
pay the beneficiary a sum of money at a given point in time.
The bill carries the signatures of both the drawer and the
drawee. By signing the bill, the drawee “accepts” the bill,
thereby entering into the obligation to the beneficiary. Bills
were negotiable instruments, freely transferable from one
party to another, and their transfer was
governed by rules for transfer and settlement
that were rigorously enforced across all the
major jurisdictions. 
In the context of the events of 1763, the cast
of characters in a typical acceptance credit
transaction would consist of the following
parties: the drawer – a Hamburg merchant
banker; the drawee – an Amsterdam
merchant banker; the beneficiary / endorser –
a Berlin merchant; and the purchaser / holder
– an Amsterdam investor. In practice, the bill
would in most cases pass through the
Hamburg bill market, but would eventually
end up in Amsterdam where most of the
capital was. Bill traders could thus exploit the
interest differences that existed between
Amsterdam, Hamburg and Berlin.
The Amsterdam merchant banker would
accept the bill on the understanding that the
Hamburg banker would redeem the bill
before the redemption date. Typically, the
Hamburg banker would maintain a balance
on his account at the Amsterdam banker, but
this promise by the Hamburg merchant
banker could also be secured on collateral in the form of
trading goods. The Amsterdam merchant bank would
receive a commission for its service in accepting the bill.
This commission typically was very small (around 0.3%),
indicating that the incurred risks were judged to be negligi-
ble. For his part, the Berlin merchant promised to repay the
Hamburg merchant banker before the bill’s redemption
date, so that the money could be passed on to the
Amsterdam merchant banker in time. This promise would
also typically be secured on collateral and the Hamburg
merchant bank would receive commission from the Berlin
merchant for its role in drawing up the bill. In addition, the
Berlin merchant would have to pay interest when discount-
ing the bill in the market. Since the bill was secured by the
signatures of the Amsterdam and the Hamburg bankers,
discount rates would be relatively low compared with the
rates that the merchant would have to pay otherwise.
As a result of this sequence of transactions, credit has
flowed from the investor in Amsterdam to the merchant in
Berlin and the intermediaries have balance sheets in which
the liabilities are exactly matched by claims on other parties. 
On the balance sheets of the intermediaries, there is an
increase on both the assets and the liabilities side, reflect-
ing the increase in leverage. The Amsterdam merchant
banker owes money to the holder of the bill, but this liability
is matched by his claim on the Hamburg merchant banker.
The Hamburg merchant banker also has an extended
balance sheet in which the liability towards the Amsterdam
banker is matched by a claim against the ultimate borrower
The events of 1763 and
1998 were both bound 
up with the exploits 
of one institution
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– the Berlin merchant. The intermediaries are
remunerated for their increased leverage and
credit risk arising from this transaction by the
commissions received for drawing up the bill.
Acceptance loans were de jure short-term
contracts, just like the traditional loans based
on bills of exchange. De facto, they were
often used for long-term borrowing as the
bills were “paid” by drawing another bill,
much like the modern practice of rolling over
short-term loans for the financing of long-term
projects. In times of crisis, however, the short-
term nature of the contract became apparent,
with the bill market drying up completely.
In reality, of course, transactions were much
more complicated than the stylised picture
given. The chains of interlinking obligations
were typically much longer, because bills
were heavily traded at exchanges. In particu-
lar, Hamburg bankers participated very
actively in the trading of bills, trying to benefit
from the difference in interest rates across
markets. In Berlin, too, there would be
merchant bankers intermediating loans, just
as there also were merchants in Hamburg
and Amsterdam in need of financing and investors in
Hamburg and Berlin. But the stylised transaction described
illustrates the overall direction of capital flows and the
nature of the interlinking obligations.
Besides the claims and liabilities “above the line”, the
parties to such transactions were also subject to contingent
liabilities and claims that were “below the line”. These arose
from the strict legal provisions for the transfer and negotia-
bility of the bills, which had two key planks: endorsement
and Wechselstrenge.
The practice of endorsement has survived to today in the
regulations governing the settlement of cheques. The
beneficiary of the bill could sell the accepted bill in the open
market after adding his signature to the bill (thus “endors-
ing” it). Indeed, any subsequent owner could endorse the
bill and sell it on the open market. However, such a transfer
was not final.Even after the sale, the new holder of the bill
had a contingent claim on the other signatories of the bill in
the event that the original drawee was unable to pay. If the
drawee was unable to honour the bill, then the drawer and
all endorsers of the bill became jointly liable. In effect, when
the beneficiary sold the bill by endorsing it, he was selling
the claim on the drawee within a “credit insurance
wrapper”. The seller of the bill was promising to insure the
buyer of the bill against default by the drawee.
The economic rationale for the institution of endorsement is
clear. By maintaining a contingent liability, the practice of
endorsement was designed to guard against the passing on
of lower quality or fraudulent bills. Also, the
fact that all signatories became jointly liable
greatly reduced the informational costs
related to seeking recourse against default.
If, by contrast, there were a strict sequencing
of liabilities, the bill would be far less attrac-
tive, since the informational demands on
demonstrating the insolvency of those higher
up the list before claiming redress on one of
the signatories would entail delays and uncer-
tainties. There would also be the potential for
collusion between sub-groups of the signato-
ries and the drawee.
The second plank of the legal enforcement
provisions for bills was Wechselstrenge,
analogous to what is known today as the
“holder in due course” provision in US and
UK law. It stipulated the legal separation of
the obligation related to the bill from any
underlying commercial transaction between
third parties. It thus ensured that claims from
bills of exchange were enforced quickly and
rigorously. 
Suppose that our Hamburg banker (the
drawer of the bill) had repaid our Amsterdam
banker (the drawee of the bill) prior to the maturity of the
bill, but that the Amsterdam banker went bust before the bill
was redeemed. Then, the holder of the bill had the right to
take the protested bill to the Hamburg banker and demand
payment, since the legal claim of the bill was in force as
long as the bill was outstanding. Thus our Hamburg banker
was being asked to “pay twice” for the same bill – once to
the (now failed) Amsterdam banker and once to the owner
of the bill. This feature of Wechselstrenge is the key to
understanding the dynamics of the crisis in 1763. The
“holder in due course” provision remains a lively topic of
debate with the advent of the Internet and the status of
digital signatures.
The Seven Years War brought an economic boom not only
to the neutral states, such as Holland and Hamburg, but
also to states involved, such as Prussia. This boom was
accompanied by a strong expansion of credit through bills
of exchange. At the same time, inflation became a
widespread phenomenon in northern Europe, as many
German states and other countries, like Sweden, financed
the war by debasing their currencies. Rapid price changes
and uncertainty formed the backdrop to speculative activi-
ties, often carried out on the basis of bills of exchange by
people with little capital of their own.
Not everybody profited from the war boom to the same
extent: huge gains could be made in the money trade, which
became more and more popular among merchant bankers,
or in the trade of war goods and exotic goods from the
West Indies. However, these profitable activities also were
Both crises are
instances of contagion
on the asset side for
the balance sheet
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the most risky ones, as the price volatility of exotic and war
goods was particularly high. In addition, trade in exotic
goods necessitated expensive investment in shipping
(much like the capital intensive telecom equipment industry
today), so that traders in these goods were particularly
vulnerable to a fall in prices.
The key advantage enjoyed by de Neufville and other
Amsterdam banks was their base in a mature financial
market with an effective legal infrastructure. Although
Hamburg bankers may have been wealthy enough to lend
directly to the borrowers in Berlin and elsewhere, the range
of services that de Neufville was able to offer – such as
access to the Amsterdam bills market – was certainly
valuable. Likewise, commentators on modern markets in
credit default swaps and other instruments observe how the
larger international banks that can offer credit as well as
investment banking services (such as Deutsche Bank,
Citicorp Salomon Smith Barney, or J. P. Morgan Chase)
have a competitive advantage over the specialised 
investment banks.
The banking house of de Neufville was founded in 1751 by
Leendert Pieter de Neufville, who was 21 at the time. It was
no more than a medium-sized firm at the beginning the war
in 1756, However, by taking full advantage of the opportuni-
ties that the buoyant war economy provided, it was
catapulted into being one of the richest and most prestigious
banking houses of Amsterdam. De Neufville’s balance sheet
reveals an extensive range of projects – in manufacturing,
goods trading, shipping, insurance and other financial activ-
ities. Thus, as well as being a banker acting as guarantor of
loans (i.e., being the drawee of bills), de Neufville was a
debt-financed entrepreneur in its own right.
The glamour and fascination associated with such success
would be familiar to contemporary observers of the
excesses of the late 1990s’ bull market. Leendert Pieter’s
opulent lifestyle was the subject of much comment and
gossip. The furnishings of his house were said to be of the
finest quality, including chests of drawers made from walnut
wood, a drawing room from yellow silk, and a fine collection
of paintings. He owned several coaches, horses, a yacht
and a manor, but (reputedly) not a single book.
De Neufville’s commercial interests were wide, both in the
range of goods he traded in and in the wide geographical
spread of his business activities. After the conclusion of
peace in February 1763 (the Peace of Hubertusburg), de
Neufville was party to a major speculative deal with the
Berlin merchant banker, Gotzkowsky, who was the pivotal
financier and entrepreneur in the Berlin of the day.
The deal involved buying up a large quantity of grain from
the departing Russian army in Poland. The purchase price
was 1 million Dutch guilders. It should be borne in mind that
any bank with capital of 1 million guilders was considered
to be a large bank in Amsterdam at the time.The largest
Amsterdam bank, Hope & Co. (which survived the crisis
largely unscathed) had a total capital of 4.3 million guilders
in 1762.
Grain prices then collapsed in Berlin, falling more than 75%
between May and August. Of course, the merchants had
known that the end of war would bring about a decrease,
but a drop of such magnitude could hardly have been
expected. Although de Neufville’s equity stake in the project
was small (only 6%), the fallout from the crash in grain
prices may have been much larger. The details of the financ-
ing of the deal are not well documented; but if, as is likely,
de Neufville had financed a substantial part of the deal for
his partners by extending acceptance loans himself or by
drawing bills on other Amsterdam bankers, the losses
resulting from the Berlin grain price collapse would have
been substantial.
These events affected market participants in two ways.
First, falling prices depressed the values of their asset
portfolios. Second, it became harder and harder to obtain
new loans needed to roll over existing debt. The tightening
of the credit market shows up clearly in the levels of
discount rates. Discount rates in Amsterdam in normal
years had been in the range of 2 to 3%. Now they rose
above 4% and fluctuated wildly. The Hamburg credit
market showed similar signs of distress, with discount rates
of up to 12% instead of the normal 4%. The tight credit
markets forced merchants and merchant bankers to sell
their assets, such as grain and sugar, to obtain the liquidity
needed for the repayment of maturing bills.
The crisis finally came to a head in Amsterdam on July 29.
The first to fail were the Amsterdam houses of Aron Joseph
& Co. and, most spectacularly, de Neufville. Some bankers
attempted to organise support for de Neufville, but this
attempt met with strong opposition from traditional banking
houses. The two failures were immediately followed by
others in Amsterdam, not only speculators, but also some
of the old-established banking houses, which had been
creditors of de Neufville. 
Two weeks later, on August 11, there was a first wave of
bank failures in Hamburg. This was in spite of the frenetic
activity on the part of Hamburg merchant bankers to
organise an officially sanctioned bailout of the failed
bankers in Amsterdam. These failures in Hamburg were in
turn followed by a second wave of failures in Amsterdam,
which were attributable to those in Hamburg (see 
Figure 1 overleaf). 
The propagation of the crisis followed the links established
by the tight web of bills of exchange. When de Neufville
and other Amsterdam houses declared themselves
bankrupt, the bills drawn on them were protested immedi-
ately and presented to the endorsers or drawers of the
bills. Due to Wechselstrenge, the Hamburg bankers could
not refuse payment, even if they had already sent 
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remittances to the Amsterdam house to settle the obliga-
tions from an acceptance loan. Many Hamburg banks were
thus forced to close down.
In turn, Berlin bankers received protested bills from
Hamburg and so the wave of bankruptcies spread conta-
giously from Amsterdam to Hamburg, Berlin and other
places. In the end, more than one hundred banks
succumbed to the crisis, most of which were located in
Hamburg.
In Berlin, the number of initial failures was relatively low.
This was due to the fact that Friedrich II – in violation of
Wechselstrenge – imposed a payments standstill on
outstanding bills and even organised outright bailouts.
However, many of the Berlin bankers who had just averted
bankruptcy in 1763 collapsed in the following depression.
In Amsterdam and Hamburg, there was no direct public
intervention, but the giro banks tried to fight the liquidity
crisis through the extension of additional Lombard loans.
However, the banks’ hands were tied by the provision that
the ratio of bank money to gold and silver holdings should
be kept close to one, so their support was but a drop in
the ocean. 
A natural place to search for the culprit for the 1763 crisis,
according to the current literature on financial crises, would
be the agency problems generated in the credit relationship
and the moral hazard on the part of the ultimate borrowers.
However, a striking feature of the crisis of 1763 was the
sequence in which the main protagonists encountered diffi-
culties. The first to fail were the Amsterdam houses,
followed by the Hamburg bankers some two weeks later,
while the ultimate borrowers in Berlin were initially spared
from widespread failures.
The crisis was followed by a period of falling industrial
production and a stagnation of credit in northern Europe.
The Amsterdam financial market was the first to recover
from the crisis. Many banking houses that had been
declared bankrupt re-opened shortly after the crisis. Those
houses that proved to be insolvent, such as de Neufville,
were allowed to fail. In the end, a large part of the debts
outstanding could be repaid, notwithstanding the high
number of initial failures. In spite of the abuse of the system
by de Neufville and others, there do not appear to have been
any modifications to the laws governing bills of exchange.
In Hamburg, too, many banks that had closed during the
crisis reopened for business. However, bankers and
merchants became much more cautious in their financial
affairs and there were no further serious financial distur-
bances until 1799.
The biggest impact of the crisis was on Berlin. The bank
failures in Amsterdam and Hamburg, and probably also the
Prussian departure from Wechselstrenge, precipitated a 
Figure 1. The number of failures in Amsterdam and Hamburg 
in July and August 1763. 
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severe credit crunch, provoking numerous bankruptcies in
the corporate sector. The situation was exacerbated by the
coin reform enacted at the end of the war, which produced
a drastic tightening of the monetary base. Prussia plunged
into a deep and long-lasting recession, which culminated in
a second wave of bankruptcies in 1766. Many of the
bankers who had just averted bankruptcy in 1763 finally
collapsed at that point.
The observation that many banks in Amsterdam and
Hamburg re-opened after the crisis indicates that the under-
lying problem of the crisis of the banks was one of illiquid-
ity and not of fundamental insolvency. This is an important
ingredient in our stylised model of the crisis. The main
insight from our model is that, in a liquidity crisis, goods
whose prices are uncorrelated in normal times become
highly correlated due to forced distress sales of market
participants. Contagion works through the combination of
direct interlinkages between agents and generalised price
declines induced by fire sales, which can cause the failure
of agents that would be solvent in the absence of liquidity
risk. The detailed description of this model can be read in
our paper “Foreshadowing LTCM: The Crisis of 1763”
(seehttp://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/Shin/working.htm). 
In the paper, we confront this “distressed sales hypothesis”
with the empirical evidence. It confirms that there was a
dramatic collapse in the prices of commodities that were
prime speculative instruments for the largest players in the
market at the time. Such dramatic declines are hard to
attribute simply to the underlying macroeconomic funda-
mentals of the economy, albeit one that was entering a
period of peace. It seems reasonable to attribute part of this
price collapse to the unwinding of speculative positions,
much of it under distressed circumstances. In addition,
correlations of commodity prices increased across goods in
Amsterdam, Hamburg, and Berlin. We conclude that the
evidence from prices is consistent with the “distressed
sales hypothesis” developed in our model. 
It remains to show the impact of the evolution of prices on
individual balance sheets. We are fortunate in that Jong-
Keesing provides a snapshot of de Neufville’s balance
sheet at the time of bankruptcy. We also have bank money
holdings figures for June 30 1763. This was a full month
before the failure of de Neufville, but by this time, the full
force of the price collapse in Berlin grain prices will have
taken its toll.
Table 1 gives some summary statistics for three banks in
Amsterdam. We can compare de Neufville’s balance sheet
with two other banks – Grill & Zonen and Hope & Co.
These two banks are representative of two classes: those
that failed, but re-opened their doors some months later,
and those that did not fail. Additionally, we report the
averages for the failed banks in Jong-Keesing’s sample,
distinguishing between those that re-opened and those that
did not. In reading the table, it should be borne in mind that
the denomination for a bill was typically around 2,000
guilders and its maturity no more than 3 months.
The most striking feature of de Neufville’s balance sheet was
the low level of liquidity, as measured by the ratio of bank
money at the Bank of Amsterdam to the total liabilities. As
compared with Grill & Zonen, de Neufville’s liquidity was
only 1/40 as large. As compared with the overall average of
failing banks in Amsterdam, de Neufville’s liquidity was 1/18. 
As another measure of liquidity we can examine the size of
bank money holding as a proportion of the number of bill
transactions. De Neufville’s holding of bank money at the
Bank of Amsterdam at the end of June 1763 had dwindled
to about the same amount as it had in 1751. Meanwhile, the
number of bill transactions had increased by a factor of 14.
Hence, the ratio of bank money holdings to the number of
bill transactions was below 6 at de Neufville, while at Hope
& Co., this ratio was well above 300.
The snapshot of de Neufville’s balance sheet at the end of
June betrays all the symptoms of a leveraged trader in
distress. The wafer thin level of liquidity would have
compelled the distressed sales of assets, especially the
Table 1. Balance Sheet Snapshot
Individual banks Full sample of failures (average)
De Neufville Grill & Zonen Hope & Co. (21 failures) (16 failures)
Failure date 30th July 4th August, Did not fail Various dates, various dates,
re-opened re-opened not re-opened
Bank Money as at June 30th 8 120 793 15 3
(Thousand guilders)
Total liabilitiesat failure date 9,643 3,000 n.a. 669 802
(thousand guilders)
Liquidity 0.1% 4.0% n.a. 2.1% 1.5%
(= bank money/total liablities)
# of bill transactions 1,395 777 2,151 241 255
(first half of 1763)
Recovery rate 11% 70% – 43% 10%
(= accord at court of bankruptcy)
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liquid assets such as grain and, thereby,
contributed to the sharp fall in the Berlin grain
price. This fits well with the evidence from Jong-
Keesing that many merchants were forced to
sell their goods in public auctions at very low
prices in order to stay liquid and supports our
view that distressed selling by merchants
exacerbated the downward movement of prices.
Unfortunately, the available data does not allow
us to directly establish the link between falling
prices and the banks’ balance sheets.
The crisis of 1763 foreshadowed many of the
events surrounding the turbulence in financial
markets in the summer and autumn of 1998.
Contrary to some popular accounts of the LTCM
crisis, which emphasised the mystique
surrounding modern financial theory, we claim
that the main themes are rather timeless and
that the essentials of the LTCM crisis are well
illustrated by its 1763 predecessor.
There is now a large literature on the origins,
personalities and the trading strategies
employed by LTCM. Its vulnerability arose from
its extremely high leveraging. Jorion (2000)
estimated LTCM’s leverage to be around 25 at
the beginning of 1998, rising rapidly to over 50 at the
height of the crisis as it suffered dramatic losses on its
portfolio. In the end, the New York Fed managed to organ-
ise a collective rescue by fourteen of LTCM’s major credi-
tors and counter parties, which prevented a disorderly
unwinding of the fund’s positions and further failures.
Neither the 1763 nor the 1998 crises fit the traditional
models used to explain financial crises. In both cases 
the institutions involved were not deposit banks, financed
through demand deposits with sequential service
constraints. The borrowing of de Neufville and LTCM 
was at maturities of several months; in addition, at 
LTCM investors’ capital was locked in for a minimum of
three years. 
Neither crisis was precipitated by nervous investors who
suddenly withdrew their money. The institutions’ creditors
do not conform to the picture of many small, uninformed
individuals that usually appear in such stories. Rather, the
creditors and counter parties were a small number of
wealthy and sophisticated market participants who were
able, and who had an incentive, to monitor the debtor due
to the large sums involved.
In addition, the managers had a lot to lose. First, they stood
to lose their capital. In 1763, there typically was no separa-
tion between the manager and the owner, and the owner
was liable with his entire wealth. In 1998, it was common
that fund managers received large incentive fees and that
they put a substantial amount of their own wealth in the fund.
Worse, the bank or fund ran the risk of
losing future rents (the “charter value”),
which presumably were quite high due to
the reputation built up in previous years.
This is even clearer in the 1763 case,
where barriers to entry in the financial
market were high. In addition, the non-
payment of bills was drastically penalised,
often by sending the debtor to prison.
Finally, there was no reason to believe that
a bank or a hedge fund would be bailed
out in case of a crisis. Amsterdam was
very much a free-market environment in
the 18th century and official interventions
were unthinkable. We have to turn to alter-
native explanations of the two crises.
Liquidity risk appears to be at the core of
both of them. We see a drying up of
liquidity in the market, forcing distressed
agents to sell their assets at prices below
their fundamental values. In 1998, it
seems clear that the high spreads
observed in financial markets cannot be
explained by credit risk alone, but have to
be attributed at least partly to liquidity risk.
Assets that used to be uncorrelated in normal times,
suddenly showed a high degree of correlation as traders
were forced into liquidating their portfolios. The fact that
many traders had accumulated similar positions meant
that such liquidations had a detrimental feedback effect on
other traders’ portfolios. The feedback effect also lowered
the value of collateral assets, which magnified the financial
distress further. When the New York Fed organised
LTCM’s rescue by its creditors, it was for fears of
systemic repercussions. First, LTCM’s counter parties
would incur direct losses, as their contracts remained
unfulfilled. Second, a disorderly unwinding of LTCM’s
positions would lead to an even stronger downward
movement of asset prices, which would affect even those
banks with no direct relationships with LTCM. This danger
was amplified by the fact that many other firms had
followed very similar strategies as LTCM and were thus
subject to the same risks. It seems that these were not so
much other hedge funds, but were the proprietary trading
desks of large banks.
With the 1998 crisis, we do not know whether there really
was the danger of a systemic meltdown. Some recent
literature has suggested that the fear might have been
exaggerated. But, in the case of the 1763 crisis, we can
see what happened in the absence of such a rescue.
There was a complete breakdown of the financial system,
spreading as far as Sweden and England. The crisis was
followed by a period of falling industrial production, a
stagnation of credit activities in the whole of northern
Europe and further bank failures, especially in Prussia.
There are limits to
how much risk can be
effectively hedged
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This indicates that a systemic meltdown is a real possibility
in a situation where banks are connected through interlock-
ing obligations and, in addition, have very similar trading
positions. “Hedging” and collateral lose much of their relia-
bility when market and credit risks are correlated and this
has to be taken into account in risk management.
We draw two policy conclusions from the events of 1763
that have wider significance:
n There are limits to how much risk can be effectively
hedged. Aggregate risk inheres in the financial system
even though each individual trader may believe that his
own risks have been hedged. At the critical moment, the
tensions finally manifest themselves in the form of
increased co-movement of prices and the increased corre-
lation between credit risk and counter party risk. The over-
confidence in financial engineering was as dangerous in
1763 as it is today.
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n Liquidity risk can have a devastating effect on a financial
system populated with traders with highly leveraged and
similar balance sheets. As one trader attempts to repair his
balance sheet by disposing of assets, the negative price
effect of this action impacts on the balance sheets of all
other traders in the financial system. This negative feedback
has the potential to trigger a self-fulfilling flight to liquidity
and the consequent damage to potentially healthy balance
sheets. In distressed market conditions, traders that are
intrinsically solvent may nevertheless be pushed into failure.
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contexts that determine our identities,
such as the work place and the family,
may have to be redefined and the
nature of work itself would be
transformed. The most radical change
to society, however, could be our
increasing longevity.
Nanotechnology’s supporters
envisage the end to disease and
suffering.
These utopian scenarios are mirrored
by equally strong predictions. Those
opposed to nanotechnology fear a
dystopian future, in which it not only
fails to bring about a perfect world,
but positively hastens humanity’s
demise. The “grey goo” scenario
envisages nanosized, self-replicating
robots getting out of control and
reproducing themselves with such
speed and in such quantities that they
obliterate the biosphere. 
This may all be an interesting and
fertile debate for social science, but
there are more imminent and
important issues surrounding
nanotechnology that are currently in
danger of being ignored.
First, it is necessary to define what
nanotechnology is. It is a generic
term to describe a range of emerging
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Science fiction
or the wave
of the future?
N
anotechnology is
provoking extreme visions
of the future of
humankind. As one
commentator
(Dinkelacker) has put it, it offers
the“possibilities of either wondrous
prosperity and freedom or a
wretched, hard-scrabble existence
under cruel oppression”.
For the optimists, new forms of
manufacturing could bring about
material abundance the world over,
undermining power based on the
control of scarce resources.
Institutions would need to restructure
to accommodate these changes. The
Nanotechnology is seen by some as a
dehumanising threat and by others as
promising almost limitless benefits. 
Stephen Wood, Richard Jones and Alison
Geldart argue that we need urgently to get
to grips with its real implications.
technologies. Its domain is defined in
terms of a length scale – from about
1 to 100 nanometers. Its importance
derives from the appearance of
different physical properties at these
length-scales. 
The underlying science – nanoscience
– is a convergence of physics,
chemistry, materials science and
biology, which investigates and
controls matter at the molecular level.
Nanoscience is here and flourishing,
with the capacity to observe and
manipulate matter at the nano level
well developed.
In contrast, nanotechnology is an
emerging engineering discipline, which
applies methods from nanoscience to
create usable, marketable and
economically viable products. It is still
very much in its infancy. In fact, the
most developed domain of
nanotechnology is the making of the
tools that enable the science. The
basic tool of nanoscience is the
scanning probe microscope that
allows individual atoms to be observed
and manipulated. Its development has
been, perhaps, the single most
important step in the crystallisation of
nano-scale science and technology as
a discipline.
Advances in the broad field that is
labelled nanotechnology are
incremental and the development of
new techniques has been a
progression from such disciplines as
materials and colloid science. The
research here is not a radical or
conceptual break from investigations
over the last 20 years. Even those
products that are heavily publicised as
relying on nanotechnology, such as
stronger materials and sunscreens,
are the results of an evolutionary
progress. In the short term, the
majority of nanotechnology products
will be fairly prosaic.
Nanotechnology’s diversity – and its
core theme of molecular manipulation
– makes it applicable in many areas.
Its promoters predict that it will have
an impact on the vast majority of
industries, from cosmetics and food,
to new materials, electronics and
defence. However, there are three
major areas where nanotechnology is
expected to make the greatest
used commonly in treatment.
Nanotechnology could contribute to
this field through advances in
scaffolds that encourage cells to 
grow in a pre-designed shape.
Biocompatible coatings are also in
development, which will make artificial
implants, such as bone replacements,
less likely to be rejected by the host’s
immune system.
Nanotechnology is also likely to
contribute to vast increases in the
availability of computing power and
information. The development of ever
faster, better, smaller and cheaper
computers will allow them to be
incorporated into even the cheapest
and smallest artefacts. Electronic tags
for product packaging are very close
to being marketed and will improve
supply chain management. Similarly,
surveillance will become cheaper and
easier and, therefore, more prevalent.
These advances raise important social
and economic issues, which have little
to do with either the utopian or the
dystopian scenarios for the future of
nanotechnology. The ease and
cheapness of storing information will
cause a growing lack of privacy. Fast
and cheap DNA sequencing could
lead to requirements for screening by
insurance companies and affect how
life insurance policies are calculated.
More efficient surveillance may lead to
less crime, but will also inhibit the
privacy of individuals.
Medical uses of nanotechnology will
further increase the intimate
association between the human body
and artificial implants. Other uses,
such as the development of display
screens that are projected directly
onto the retina, promise to further
reduce the differences between
humans and machines. We have been
taking structures from living things to
use in artificial contexts throughout
history, but further developments in
bionanotechnology could see the
radical modification of bacteria to
make new functional devices. This
raises questions of whether such a
radical remodelling of a living
organism is ethically acceptable.
Economic issues also need to be
considered. As investors latch onto
nanotechnology as a buzzword and
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difference: sustainable energy,
medicine and information.
Environmentalists are often
suspicious of new technology and its
potential impact on the world; yet,
developed responsibly,
nanotechnology could signal the end
of our reliance on fossil fuels. It
promises advances in several
alternative sources of power, such as
solar and hydrogen fuel cells.
Research being undertaken into new
materials for photovoltaics, such as
carbon nanotubes and
semiconducting polymers, could soon
lead to cheaper and more efficient
solar cells. If significant improvements
can be made in this area,
nanotechnology could potentially
lower the cost of energy generated
by solar cells towards that from non-
renewable energy sources, such as
gas and oil.
In medicine, nanotechnology could
transform drug delivery, diagnostics
and monitoring systems, and artificial
implants. Drug particles would be
encased in nanoparticles, either to
protect the active element from the
body’s defences until it reached its
desired target, or to protect the 
body from their unwanted side
effects. In diagnostics, “laboratory-on-
a-chip” technology could eliminate 
the need to take large fluid samples
and could even respond to
biochemical changes within the body.
Diabetics, for instance, could benefit
from the development of a chip that
monitors insulin levels and secretes
the required hormone into the
bloodstream as needed.
Artificial implants continue to be
developed and artificial skin is now
Its basic tool is the scanning
probe microscope
There is the risk of over-hype
national governments race to become
the world leaders in research and
development, there is the risk of over-
hype, leading to a stock market
bubble and the collapse of the
emergent industry. Technological
development is driven by market
opportunities, generating questions
about inequity and economic divides.
Will nanotechnology lead to the
eradication of poverty through material
abundance and beneficial
applications, as the utopians predict;
or will most products be those that
are highly profitable and aimed at a
richer market, such as cosmetics and
life extension?
These are some of the real issues
which social science needs to
investigate as nanotechnology
develops. The danger is that they will
be lost in either futuristic enthusiasm
or indiscriminate pessimism. The
opportunity is here now to prepare
society for the technological changes
that are coming. 
Involving social science in the debates
about technological development will
help to guide it in a more socially
useful way. Nanotechnology is a
unique opportunity for scientists and
social scientists to work together.
There are currently three generic
questions fertile for research:
n how technological change is
governed, including an understanding
of the drivers and decision processes
at the various key points of choice;
n how social learning occurs,
including how conflicts of interest can
be identified and clarified in a way that
fosters informed debate; and 
n how evaluation of risk and
opportunities under uncertainty is
accomplished, particularly looking at
how scientists, technologists and
firms can best be regulated and at the
limits of the nation state’s ability to act
as a regulator in an increasingly
international world.
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Surveillance will become
cheaper and more prevalent
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